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A	  ‘Composite	  Utterances’	  approach	  to	  meaning	  N.	  J.	  Enfield	  	  In	  human	  social	  behavior,	  people	  build	  communicative	  sequences,	  move	  by	  move.	  These	  moves	  are	  never	  semiotically	  simple.	  Their	  composite	  nature	  is	  widely	  varied	  in	  kind:	  they	  may	  consist	  of	  a	  word	  combined	  with	  other	  words,	  a	  string	  of	  words	  combined	  with	  an	  intonation	  contour,	  a	  diagram	  combined	  with	  a	  caption,	  an	  icon	  combined	  with	  another	  icon,	  a	  spoken	  utterance	  combined	  with	  a	  hand	  gesture.	  By	  what	  means	  does	  an	  interpreter	  take	  multiple	  signs	  and	  draw	  them	  together	  into	  unified,	  meaningful	  packages?	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  question	  with	  special	  reference	  to	  one	  of	  our	  most	  familiar	  types	  of	  move,	  the	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composite,	  a	  classical	  locus	  of	  research	  on	  body,	  language,	  and	  communication	  (see	  other	  chapters	  of	  this	  handbook	  relating	  to	  gesture,	  and	  many	  references	  therein).	  The	  central	  question	  is	  this:	  How	  do	  gestures	  contribute	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  utterance?	  To	  answer	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  situate	  research	  on	  gesture	  within	  broader	  questions	  of	  research	  on	  meaning.	  	  1.1	  Meaning	  does	  not	  begin	  with	  language	  	  In	  a	  person’s	  vast	  array	  of	  communicative	  tools,	  language	  is	  surely	  unrivalled	  in	  its	  expressive	  richness,	  speed,	  productivity,	  and	  ease.	  But	  the	  interpretation	  of	  linguistic	  signs	  is	  ultimately	  driven	  by	  broader	  principles,	  principles	  of	  rational	  cognition	  in	  social	  life,	  principles	  which	  underlie	  other	  processes	  of	  human	  judgment,	  from	  house-­‐buying	  to	  gambling	  to	  passing	  people	  on	  a	  crowded	  street.	  So,	  to	  understand	  meaning	  in	  human	  utterances,	  we	  ought	  not	  begin	  with	  language	  (Enfield	  and	  Levinson	  2006:28).	  There	  is	  meaning	  in	  language	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  there	  is	  meaning	  elsewhere	  in	  our	  social	  lives:	  because	  we	  take	  signs	  to	  be	  public	  elements	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  (Peirce	  1955),	  evidence	  of	  others’	  communicative	  intentions	  (Grice	  1957,	  1975).	  Our	  clues	  for	  figuring	  out	  those	  intentions	  are	  found	  not	  only	  in	  conventional	  symbols	  like	  words,	  but	  in	  the	  rich	  iconic-­‐indexical	  relations	  which	  weave	  threads	  between	  just	  about	  everything	  in	  sight	  (Peirce	  1955,	  Silverstein	  1976,	  Levinson	  1983,	  Kockelman	  2005).	  Language	  is	  just	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  full	  resources	  necessary	  for	  recognizing	  others’	  communicative	  and	  informative	  intentions.	  	  1.2	  Meaning	  is	  dynamic,	  motivated,	  and	  concrete	  	  Among	  fashions	  of	  thinking	  about	  language	  over	  the	  last	  century,	  a	  dominant	  neo-­‐Saussurean	  view	  says	  that	  meaning	  is	  a	  representational	  relation	  of	  phonological	  form	  to	  conceptual	  content:	  A	  sign	  has	  meaning	  because	  it	  specifies	  a	  standing-­‐for	  relation	  between	  a	  signifier	  and	  a	  signified.	  Semanticists	  of	  many	  different	  kinds	  agree	  on	  this	  (cf.	  Jackendoff	  1983,	  Cruse	  1986,	  Langacker	  1987,	  




Wierzbicka	  1996,	  among	  many	  others).	  But	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  question	  whether	  a	  view	  of	  signs	  as	  static,	  arbitrary,	  and	  abstract	  is	  an	  adequate	  depiction	  of	  the	  facts,	  or	  even	  optimal	  as	  an	  analytic	  framework	  of	  convenience.	  There	  is	  reason	  to	  stay	  closer	  to	  the	  source,	  to	  see	  signs	  as	  they	  are,	  first	  and	  foremost:	  dynamic,	  motivated,	  and	  concrete	  (Hanks	  1990).	  To	  explicate	  this	  point:	  Standard	  statements	  about	  meaning	  such	  as	  ‘the	  word	  X	  means	  Y’	  really	  mean	  ‘people	  who	  utter	  the	  word	  X	  are	  normatively	  taken	  by	  others	  to	  intend	  Y	  across	  a	  range	  of	  contexts’.	  We	  should	  not,	  then,	  understand	  dichotomies	  like	  static	  versus	  dynamic,	  arbitrary	  versus	  motivated,	  or	  abstract	  versus	  concrete	  as	  merely	  two	  sides	  of	  a	  single	  coin.	  The	  relation	  is	  asymmetrical,	  since	  we	  are	  always	  anchored	  in	  the	  dynamic-­‐motivated-­‐concrete	  realm	  of	  contextualized	  communicative	  signs.	  	  Some	  traditions	  doubt	  whether	  a	  Saussurean	  ‘form-­‐meaning	  mapping’	  account	  of	  meaning	  is	  appropriate.	  In	  research	  on	  co-­‐speech	  hand	  gesture,	  McNeill	  (2005)	  has	  forcefully	  questioned	  the	  adequacy	  of	  a	  coding-­‐for-­‐decoding	  model	  of	  communication.	  The	  same	  point	  has	  long	  been	  made	  for	  more	  general	  reasons,	  in	  more	  encompassing	  theories	  of	  semiosis,	  and	  in	  theories	  of	  how	  types	  of	  linguistic	  structure	  mean	  what	  they	  mean	  when	  used	  as	  tokens	  in	  context	  (Grice	  1975).	  Thus,	  alternatives	  to	  a	  static	  view	  of	  meaning	  are	  available	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  specific	  problems	  of	  co-­‐speech	  gesture.	  These	  come	  from	  two	  sources:	  (neo-­‐)Peircean	  semiotics	  (e.g.,	  Peirce	  1955,	  Colapietro	  1989,	  Parmentier	  1994,	  Kockelman	  2005)	  and	  (neo-­‐)Gricean	  pragmatics	  (e.g.,	  Grice	  1975,	  Levinson	  1983,	  2000,	  Sperber	  and	  Wilson	  1995,	  Horn	  1989,	  Atlas	  2005).	  Subsequent	  sections	  explore	  the	  relevant	  analytic	  tools	  offered	  by	  these	  traditions.	  	  1.3	  Meaning	  is	  a	  composite	  notion	  	  When	  people	  say	  things	  they	  typically	  do	  so	  by	  combining	  words	  with	  images.	  A	  relatively	  simple	  example	  of	  a	  composite	  sign	  is	  the	  image-­‐with-­‐caption	  format	  typified	  by	  photographs	  and	  artwork.	  What	  makes	  this	  kind	  of	  thing	  a	  composite	  sign	  is	  that	  the	  visual	  image	  and	  the	  string	  of	  words	  are	  taken	  together	  as	  part	  of	  the	  artist’s	  single	  overall	  intention	  (Preissler	  and	  Bloom	  2008;	  cf.	  Richert	  and	  Lillard	  2002).	  The	  image	  and	  the	  words	  are	  different	  types	  of	  signs,	  but	  they	  are	  presented	  together,	  and	  taken	  together,	  in	  a	  composite.	  Interpreting	  such	  composites	  is	  done	  by	  means	  of	  a	  general	  heuristic	  of	  semiotic	  unity:	  when	  encountering	  multiple	  signs	  which	  are	  presented	  together,	  take	  them	  as	  one.	  This	  example	  illustrates	  essentially	  the	  same	  thing	  we	  find	  in	  the	  co-­‐occurrence	  of	  expressive	  hand	  movements	  with	  speech:	  context-­‐situated	  composites	  of	  multiple	  signs,	  part	  conventional,	  part	  non-­‐conventional.	  Consider	  Figure	  1.1,	  an	  image	  from	  a	  video-­‐recording	  showing	  three	  Lao	  men	  sitting	  in	  a	  village	  temple,	  one	  of	  them	  thrusting	  his	  arm	  forward	  and	  down,	  with	  his	  gaze	  fixed	  on	  it.	  (Note:	  This	  example	  and	  the	  following	  one	  are	  from	  a	  corpus	  of	  video-­‐recorded	  talk	  collected	  in	  Laos	  since	  2000;	  as	  should	  be	  obvious,	  the	  point	  I	  am	  making	  here	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  the	  Lao	  data,	  and	  could	  be	  illustrated	  with	  comparable	  data	  from	  any	  other	  culture.)	  	  FIGURE	  1.1	  HERE	  




	  The	  discussion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Fgure	  1.1	  is	  about	  construction	  works	  under	  way	  in	  the	  temple.	  The	  man	  on	  the	  left	  is	  reporting	  on	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  installation	  of	  drainage	  pipes	  from	  a	  bathroom	  block.	  He	  says	  that	  the	  drainage	  pipes	  have	  been	  fixed	  at	  too	  low	  an	  angle,	  and	  they	  should,	  instead,	  drop	  more	  sharply,	  to	  ensure	  good	  run-­‐off.	  As	  he	  says	  haj5	  man2	  san2	  cang1	  sii4	  ‘Make	  it	  steep	  like	  this’,	  he	  thrusts	  his	  arm	  forward	  and	  down,	  fixing	  his	  gaze	  on	  it,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.1.	  The	  meanings	  of	  his	  words	  and	  his	  gesture	  are	  tightly	  linked,	  through	  at	  least	  three	  devices:	  (1)	  their	  tight	  spatiotemporal	  co-­‐occurrence	  in	  place	  and	  time	  (both	  produced	  by	  the	  same	  source),	  (2)	  the	  use	  of	  the	  explicit	  deictic	  expression	  ‘like	  this’	  (sending	  us	  on	  a	  search:	  ‘Like	  what?’,	  and	  leading	  us	  to	  consult	  the	  gesture	  for	  an	  answer),	  (3)	  the	  use	  of	  eye	  gaze	  for	  directing	  attention.	  	  A	  similar	  case	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1.2,	  from	  a	  description	  of	  a	  type	  of	  traditional	  Lao	  fish	  trap	  called	  the	  sòòn5	  (see	  Enfield	  2009:	  Chapter	  5).	  	  FIGURE	  1.2	  HERE	  	  Again	  we	  see	  a	  speaker’s	  overall	  utterance	  meaning	  as	  a	  unified	  product	  of	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information:	  (a)	  a	  string	  of	  words	  (itself	  a	  composite	  sign	  consisting	  of	  words	  and	  grammatical	  constructions),	  (b)	  a	  two-­‐handed	  gesture,	  (c)	  tight	  spatiotemporal	  co-­‐occurrence	  of	  the	  words	  and	  gestures	  (from	  a	  single	  source),	  and	  (d)	  eye	  gaze	  directed	  toward	  the	  hands,	  also	  helping	  to	  connect	  the	  composite	  utterance’s	  multiple	  parts.	  This	  is	  subtly	  different	  from	  Figure	  1.1	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  an	  explicit	  deictic	  element	  in	  the	  speech.	  Like	  the	  picture-­‐with-­‐caption	  examples	  mentioned	  above,	  spatiotemporal	  co-­‐placement	  in	  Figure	  1.2	  is	  sufficient	  to	  signal	  semiotic	  unity.	  The	  gesture,	  gaze	  and	  speech	  components	  of	  the	  utterance	  are	  taken	  together	  as	  a	  unified	  whole.	  As	  interpreters,	  we	  effortlessly	  integrate	  them	  as	  relating	  to	  one	  overall	  idea.	  	  A	  general	  theory	  of	  composite	  meaning	  takes	  Figures	  1.1	  and	  1.2,	  along	  with	  road	  signs,	  paintings	  on	  gallery	  walls,	  and	  captioned	  photographs	  to	  be	  instances	  of	  a	  single	  phenomenon:	  signs	  co-­‐occurring	  with	  other	  signs,	  acquiring	  unified	  meaning	  through	  being	  interpreted	  as	  co-­‐relevant	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  whole.	  A	  general	  account	  for	  how	  the	  meanings	  of	  multiple	  signs	  are	  unified	  in	  any	  one	  of	  these	  cases	  should	  apply	  to	  them	  all,	  along	  with	  many	  other	  species	  of	  composite	  sign,	  including	  co-­‐occurring	  icons	  in	  street	  signs,	  grammatical	  unification	  of	  lexical	  items	  and	  constructions,	  and	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites.	  	  In	  studying	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture,	  there	  are	  two	  important	  desiderata	  for	  an	  account	  of	  composite	  meaning.	  A	  first	  requirement	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  modality-­‐independent	  account	  of	  ‘gesture’	  (Okrent	  2002).	  While	  we	  want	  to	  capture	  the	  intuition	  that	  co-­‐speech	  hand	  gesture	  (manual-­‐visual)	  conveys	  meaning	  somehow	  differently	  to	  speech	  (vocal-­‐aural),	  this	  has	  to	  be	  articulated	  without	  reference	  to	  modality.	  We	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  what	  makes	  speech-­‐accompanying	  hand	  movements	  ‘gestural’	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  we	  can	  sensibly	  ask	  as	  to	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  co-­‐speech	  gesture	  in	  other	  kinds	  of	  composite	  utterances;	  for	  example,	  in	  sign	  language	  of	  the	  Deaf	  (all	  visual,	  but	  not	  all	  




‘gesture’),	  or	  in	  speech	  heard	  over	  the	  phone	  (all	  vocal-­‐aural,	  but	  not	  all	  ‘language’).	  	  A	  second	  desideratum	  for	  an	  account	  of	  meaning	  in	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  is	  to	  capture	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘holistic’	  meaning	  in	  hand	  gestures,	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  hand	  gesture	  has	  the	  meaning	  it	  has	  only	  because	  of	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  utterance	  as	  a	  whole	  (McNeill	  1992,	  2005,	  Engle	  1998).	  If	  we	  want	  to	  achieve	  analytic	  generality,	  then	  a	  notion	  of	  holistic	  meaning	  is	  required	  not	  only	  for	  analyzing	  the	  meaning	  of	  co-­‐speech	  hand	  gesture,	  but	  more	  generally	  for	  analyzing	  linguistic	  and	  other	  types	  of	  signs	  as	  well.	  This	  results	  from	  acknowledging	  that	  an	  interpreter’s	  task	  begins	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  signer’s	  communicative	  intention	  (i.e.,	  recognizing	  that	  the	  signer	  has	  an	  informative	  intention).	  The	  subsequent	  quest	  to	  lock	  onto	  a	  target	  informative	  intention	  can	  drive	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  composite	  utterance’s	  parts,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  1.4	  Composite	  utterances	  	  1.4.1	  Contexts	  of	  hand	  gesture	  	  One	  view	  of	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  is	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  co-­‐expressive	  hand	  and	  word	  is	  a	  reciprocal	  one:	  ‘the	  gestural	  component	  and	  the	  spoken	  component	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  to	  create	  a	  precise	  and	  vivid	  understanding’	  (Kendon	  2004:174,	  original	  emphasis;	  cf.	  Özyürek	  et	  al	  2007).	  By	  what	  mechanism	  does	  this	  reciprocal	  interaction	  between	  hand	  and	  word	  unfold?	  Different	  approaches	  to	  analyzing	  meanings	  of	  co-­‐speech	  gestures	  find	  evidence	  of	  a	  gesture’s	  meaning	  in	  a	  range	  of	  sources,	  including	  (i)	  speech	  which	  co-­‐occurs	  together	  with	  the	  hand	  movement,	  (ii)	  a	  prior	  stimulus	  or	  cause	  of	  the	  utterance	  in	  which	  the	  gesture	  occurs,	  (iii)	  a	  subsequent	  response	  to,	  or	  effect	  of,	  the	  utterance,	  or	  (iv)	  purely	  formal	  characteristics	  of	  the	  gesture.	  These	  four	  sources,	  often	  combined,	  draw	  on	  different	  components	  of	  a	  single	  underlying	  model	  of	  the	  communicative	  move	  and	  its	  sequential	  context,	  where	  the	  hand-­‐movement	  component	  of	  the	  composite	  utterance	  is	  contextualized	  from	  three	  angles:	  A.	  what	  just	  happened,	  B.	  what	  else	  is	  happening	  now,	  C.	  what	  happens	  next.	  This	  three-­‐part	  sequential	  structure	  underlies	  a	  basic	  trajectory	  model	  recognized	  by	  many	  students	  of	  human	  social	  behaviour.	  Schutz	  (1970),	  for	  example,	  speaks	  of	  actions	  (at	  B)	  having	  ‘because	  motives’	  (at	  A)	  and	  ‘in-­‐order-­‐to	  motives’	  (at	  C;	  e.g.,	  I’m	  picking	  berries	  [B]	  because	  I’m	  hungry	  [A],	  in	  order	  to	  eat	  them	  [C];	  cf.	  Sacks	  1992,	  Schegloff	  2007	  among	  many	  others).	  	  1.4.2.	  Enchrony:	  the	  context	  of	  composite	  utterances	  	  Any	  utterance	  is	  a	  situated	  unit	  of	  social	  behaviour	  with	  causes	  (or	  conditions)	  and	  effects	  (Goffman	  1964,	  Schegloff	  1968).	  An	  intentional	  cause	  and	  interpretive	  effect	  are	  as	  definitive	  of	  the	  process	  of	  meaning	  as	  the	  pivotal	  signifying	  behaviour	  itself.	  Any	  communicative	  move	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  arising	  more	  or	  less	  appropriately	  from	  certain	  commitments	  and	  entitlements,	  and	  in	  turn	  bringing	  about	  new	  commitments	  and	  entitlements	  (Austin	  1962,	  Searle	  




1969),	  for	  which	  interlocutors	  are	  subsequently	  accountable.	  As	  an	  analytical	  framework,	  this	  remedies	  the	  static,	  decontextualized	  nature	  of	  Saussure’s	  version	  of	  meaning	  (Kockelman	  2005).	  But	  this	  is	  not	  merely	  because	  it	  recognizes	  that	  meaning	  arises	  through	  a	  process	  (McNeill	  2005),	  it	  is	  because	  it	  recognizes	  the	  causal/conditional	  and	  normative	  anatomy	  of	  sequences	  of	  communicative	  interaction,	  where	  each	  step	  brings	  about	  a	  new	  horizon,	  with	  consequences	  for	  the	  people	  involved	  (Schegloff	  1968,	  Sacks	  et	  al	  1974,	  Goffman	  1981,	  Heritage	  and	  Atkinson	  1984).	  Accordingly,	  we	  need	  a	  term	  for	  a	  causal,	  dynamic	  perspective	  on	  language	  whose	  granularity	  matches	  the	  pace	  of	  our	  most	  experience-­‐near,	  moment-­‐by-­‐moment	  deployment	  of	  utterances	  in	  interaction,	  not	  historical	  time	  (for	  which	  the	  term	  diachronic	  is	  standard)	  but	  conversational	  time.	  For	  this	  I	  use	  the	  word	  enchronic.	  While	  diachronic	  analysis	  is	  concerned	  with	  relations	  between	  data	  from	  different	  years	  (with	  no	  specified	  type	  or	  directness	  of	  causal/conditional	  relations),	  enchronic	  analysis	  is	  concerned	  with	  relations	  between	  data	  from	  neighbouring	  moments,	  adjacent	  units	  of	  behaviour	  in	  locally	  coherent	  communicative	  sequences	  (typically,	  conversations).	  The	  real-­‐time	  birth	  and	  development	  of	  a	  composite	  utterance	  from	  a	  producer’s	  point	  of	  view	  (for	  which	  we	  might	  use	  the	  term	  microgenesis)	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  intended	  meaning	  of	  enchronic	  here,	  namely	  the	  intersection	  of	  (a)	  a	  social	  causal/conditionality	  of	  related	  signs	  in	  sequences	  of	  social	  interaction	  and	  (b)	  a	  particular	  level	  of	  temporal	  granularity	  in	  a	  conditionally	  sequential	  view	  of	  language:	  conversational	  time.	  An	  enchronic	  perspective	  adopts	  the	  sequential	  analytic	  approach	  whose	  application	  in	  empirical	  work	  as	  pioneered	  by	  Schegloff	  (1968)	  and	  Sacks	  (1992),	  following	  earlier	  work	  in	  sociology.	  To	  call	  it	  enchronic	  rather	  than	  merely	  sequential	  (in	  the	  technical	  sense	  of	  Schegloff	  2007)	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  broader	  set	  of	  alternative	  viewpoints	  on	  systems	  and	  processes	  of	  meaning	  which	  we	  often	  need	  to	  switch	  between	  (including	  phylogenetic,	  diachronic,	  ontogenetic,	  and	  synchronic).	  	  1.4.3.	  The	  move:	  a	  basic-­‐level	  unit	  for	  social	  interaction	  	  A	  primitive	  unit	  of	  an	  enchronic	  perspective	  is	  the	  communicative	  move	  (Goffman	  1981).	  A	  move	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  recognizable	  unit	  contribution	  of	  communicative	  behaviour	  constituting	  a	  single,	  complete	  pushing	  forward	  of	  an	  interactional	  sequence	  by	  means	  of	  making	  some	  relevant	  social	  action	  recognizable	  (e.g.,	  requesting	  the	  salt,	  passing	  it,	  saying	  Thanks).	  In	  communication,	  a	  richly	  multimodal	  flux	  of	  impressions	  is	  brought	  to	  order	  by	  these	  joint-­‐attentional	  pulses	  of	  addressed	  behaviour	  (e.g.,	  bursts	  of	  talk)	  marked	  off	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  and	  space,	  yielding	  sequences	  of	  co-­‐contingent	  social	  action	  (Goodwin	  2000,	  Schegloff	  2007).	  The	  linguistic	  utterance	  is	  a	  well-­‐studied	  (if	  idealized)	  type	  of	  instantiation	  of	  the	  move	  (cf.	  Austin	  1962,	  Searle	  1969).	  With	  this	  basic-­‐level	  status,	  the	  linguistic	  move	  will	  be	  homologous	  with	  usage-­‐based	  analytic	  units	  of	  language	  such	  as	  the	  clause	  (Foley	  and	  Van	  Valin	  1984),	  the	  intonation	  unit	  (Pawley	  and	  Syder	  2000,	  Chafe	  1994),	  the	  turn-­‐constructional	  unit	  (Sacks,	  Schegloff,	  and	  Jefferson	  1974),	  the	  growth	  point	  (McNeill	  1992),	  the	  composite	  signal	  (Engle	  1998;	  cf.	  Clark	  1996),	  and	  the	  utterance	  as	  multimodal	  ensemble	  (Kendon	  2004,	  Goodwin	  2000).	  Whatever	  its	  physical	  form,	  the	  move	  is	  a	  single-­‐serve	  vehicle	  for	  effecting	  action	  socially.	  




	  An	  important	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  move’s	  primitive	  or	  basic-­‐level	  status	  is	  its	  role	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  communicative	  skills	  in	  children.	  Before	  learning	  their	  first	  words,	  children	  master	  the	  move,	  beginning	  with	  its	  prototype,	  the	  pointing	  gesture	  (Kita	  2003).	  A	  line	  of	  research	  in	  developmental	  psychology	  has	  identified	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  pointing	  gesture	  as	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  the	  development	  of	  human	  social	  cognitive	  and	  communicative	  capacities,	  both	  ontogenetically	  and	  phylogenetically	  (Bates	  et	  al	  1975,	  Bates	  et	  al	  1987,	  Liszkowski	  et	  al	  2004,	  Tomasello	  2006).	  The	  pointing	  gesture	  is	  mastered	  by	  prelinguistic	  infants	  (by	  around	  12	  months	  of	  age)	  and	  it	  is	  the	  first	  type	  of	  move	  to	  unequivocally	  display	  the	  sort	  of	  shared	  intentionality	  unique	  to	  human	  communication	  and	  social	  cognition	  (Tomasello	  et	  al	  2005,	  Liszkowski	  2006,	  Frith	  and	  Frith	  2007).	  	  The	  move	  is	  therefore	  a	  starting	  point,	  a	  seed,	  a	  template	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  signs	  in	  interaction.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  move	  is	  a	  brick	  for	  larger	  structures,	  building	  up	  and	  out,	  into	  conversational	  sequences	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  coherent	  discourse	  structure	  (Halliday	  and	  Hasan	  1976,	  Schegloff	  2007).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  a	  frame	  or	  exoskeleton	  within	  which	  internal	  semiotic	  complexity	  may	  appear,	  building	  down	  and	  in,	  yielding	  phrase	  distinctions,	  morphosyntax,	  information	  structure,	  and	  logical	  semantics.	  Much	  of	  the	  existing	  research	  on	  gesture,	  such	  as	  found	  in	  this	  handbook,	  examines	  the	  kinds	  of	  structure	  that	  arise	  when	  moves	  are	  built	  from	  word	  and	  hand	  together.	  	  1.4.4	  Conventional	  and	  non-­‐conventional	  components	  of	  composite	  utterances	  	  Three	  types	  of	  sign	  are	  important	  in	  interpreting	  composite	  utterances:	  conventional	  signs,	  non-­‐conventional	  signs,	  and	  symbolic	  indexicals.	  For	  convenience,	  I	  simplify	  the	  analysis	  of	  sign	  types	  employed	  here.	  A	  full	  anatomy	  of	  sign	  types	  would	  lay	  out	  the	  logical	  possibilities	  first	  mapped	  by	  Peirce	  (1955),	  and	  most	  accessibly	  interpreted	  by	  Parmentier	  (1994)	  and	  Kockelman	  (2005).	  The	  notion	  of	  conventional	  sign	  here	  corresponds	  to	  Peirce’s	  symbol,	  non-­‐conventional	  sign	  includes	  his	  icon	  and	  index.	  The	  Peircean	  type/token	  distinction	  (Hutton	  1990)	  cuts	  across	  these	  (see	  below).	  A	  conventional	  sign	  is	  found	  when	  people	  take	  a	  certain	  signifier	  to	  stand	  for	  a	  certain	  signified	  because	  that	  is	  what	  members	  of	  their	  community	  normatively	  do	  (Saussure	  1916/1959;	  on	  norms,	  see	  Brandom	  1979,	  Kockelman	  2006).	  This	  kind	  of	  sign	  allows	  for	  arbitrary	  relations	  like	  /khæt/	  referring	  to	  ‘cat’,	  by	  which	  the	  cause	  of	  my	  taking	  [khæt]	  to	  mean	  ‘cat’	  is	  my	  experience	  with	  previous	  occasions	  of	  use	  of	  tokens	  of	  the	  signifier	  /khæt/.	  Examples	  of	  conventional	  signs	  include	  words	  and	  grammatical	  constructions,	  idioms,	  and	  ‘emblem’	  hand	  gestures	  such	  as	  the	  OK	  sign,	  V	  for	  Victory,	  or	  The	  Finger	  (Ekman	  and	  Friesen	  1969,	  Brookes	  2004).	  Non-­‐conventional	  signs,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  found	  when	  people	  take	  certain	  signifiers	  to	  stand	  for	  certain	  signifieds	  not	  because	  of	  previous	  experience	  with	  that	  particular	  form-­‐meaning	  pair	  or	  from	  social	  convention,	  but	  where	  the	  standing-­‐for	  relation	  between	  form	  and	  meaning	  comes	  about	  by	  virtue	  of	  just	  that	  singular	  event	  of	  interpretation.	  Examples	  include	  representational	  hand	  




gestures	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  Kita	  2000),	  that	  is,	  where	  the	  gesture	  component	  of	  an	  utterance	  is	  a	  token,	  analogue	  representation	  of	  its	  object.	  	  The	  symbolic	  indexical	  is	  a	  hybrid	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  sign	  just	  described,	  having	  properties	  of	  both.	  These	  include	  anything	  that	  comes	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  deixis	  (Fillmore	  1997,	  Levinson	  1983),	  that	  is,	  form-­‐meaning	  mappings	  whose	  proper	  interpretation	  depends	  partly	  on	  convention	  and	  partly	  on	  context	  (Bühler	  1982/1934,	  Jakobson	  1971,	  Silverstein	  1976).	  Take	  for	  example	  him	  in	  Take	  a	  
photo	  of	  him.	  Your	  understanding	  of	  him	  will	  depend	  partly	  on	  your	  recognition	  of	  a	  conventional,	  context-­‐independent	  meaning	  of	  the	  English	  form	  him	  (third	  person,	  singular,	  male,	  accusative)	  and	  partly	  on	  non-­‐conventional	  facts	  unique	  to	  the	  speech	  event	  (e.g.,	  whichever	  male	  referent	  is	  most	  salient	  given	  our	  current	  joint	  attention	  and	  common	  ground).	  Symbolic	  indexicals	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  many	  types	  of	  composite	  utterance,	  since	  their	  job	  is	  to	  glue	  things	  together,	  including	  words,	  gestures,	  and	  (imagined)	  things	  in	  the	  world	  (see	  Part	  I	  of	  Enfield	  2009,	  and	  studies	  of	  pointing	  in	  this	  handbook).	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  three	  kinds	  of	  sign,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  type	  and	  token	  (Peirce	  1955,	  Hutton	  1990).	  All	  of	  the	  signs	  discussed	  above	  occur	  as	  tokens,	  that	  is,	  as	  perceptible,	  contextualized,	  unique	  instances.	  But	  only	  conventional	  signs	  (including	  conventional	  components	  of	  symbolic	  indexicals)	  necessarily	  have	  both	  type	  and	  token	  identities.	  That	  is,	  when	  they	  occur	  as	  tokens,	  they	  are	  tokens	  of	  types,	  or	  what	  Peirce	  called	  replicas.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  their	  abstract	  type	  identity	  that	  conventional	  signs	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  meaningful	  independent	  of	  context,	  as	  having	  ‘sense’	  (Frege	  1892/1960),	  ‘timeless	  meaning’	  (Grice	  1989)	  or	  ‘semantic	  invariance’	  (Wierzbicka	  1985,	  1996).	  Conventional	  signs	  are	  pre-­‐fabricated	  signs,	  already	  signs	  by	  their	  very	  nature.	  By	  contrast,	  non-­‐conventional	  signs	  (including	  non-­‐conventional	  components	  of	  symbolic	  indexicals)	  are	  tokens	  but	  not	  tokens	  of	  types.	  They	  are	  singularities	  (Kockelman	  2005).	  They	  become	  signs	  only	  when	  taken	  as	  signs	  in	  context.	  This	  is	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  asymmetries	  we	  observe	  in	  composite	  utterances	  such	  as	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  ensembles.	  A	  hand	  gesture	  may	  be	  a	  conventional	  sign	  (e.g.,	  as	  ‘emblem’).	  Or	  it	  may	  be	  non-­‐conventional,	  only	  becoming	  a	  sign	  because	  of	  how	  it	  is	  used	  in	  that	  context	  (e.g.,	  as	  ‘iconic’	  or	  ‘metaphoric’).	  Or	  it	  may	  be	  a	  symbolic	  indexical	  (e.g.,	  as	  pointing	  gesture,	  with	  conventionally	  recognizable	  form,	  but	  dependent	  on	  token	  context	  for	  referential	  resolution).	  Hand	  gestures	  are	  not	  at	  all	  unique	  in	  this	  regard:	  the	  linguistic	  component	  of	  an	  utterance	  may,	  similarly,	  be	  conventional	  (e.g.,	  words,	  grammar),	  non-­‐conventional	  (e.g.,	  voice	  quality,	  sound	  stretches),	  or	  symbolic	  indexical	  (e.g.,	  demonstratives	  like	  yay	  or	  this).	  Ditto	  for	  sign	  components	  of	  graphs,	  diagrams,	  and	  other	  illustrations.	  Sensory	  or	  articulatory	  modality	  is	  no	  obstacle	  to	  semiotic	  flexibility.	  	  Before	  concluding	  this	  section,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  registering	  a	  common	  inconsistency	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  hand	  movements	  in	  composite	  utterances.	  The	  problem	  is	  an	  inconsistent	  treatment	  of	  the	  way	  meaning	  is	  attributed	  to	  words,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  gestures,	  on	  the	  other.	  Linguistic	  items	  like	  words	  are	  often	  described	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  conventionally	  




encode	  (as	  standing	  for	  lexical	  types),	  while	  gestures	  are	  typically	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  non-­‐conventionally	  convey	  (as	  standing	  for	  utterance-­‐level	  tokens	  of	  informative	  intention).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  interpreter’s	  problem	  of	  comprehending	  word	  meaning	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  one	  of	  recognition	  (from	  token	  form	  to	  type	  lexical	  entry),	  while	  the	  problem	  of	  comprehending	  gesture	  meaning	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  one	  of	  interpretation	  (from	  token	  form	  to	  token	  informative	  intention).	  The	  inconsistency	  here	  is	  that	  it	  overlooks	  the	  fact	  that	  comprehension	  of	  the	  linguistic	  component	  also	  involves	  interpretation	  yielding	  token	  informative	  intentions.	  In	  interpreting	  the	  meanings	  of	  words,	  we	  do	  not	  stop	  with	  mere	  recognition	  of	  type	  lexical	  entries,	  but,	  just	  like	  with	  gestures,	  we	  also	  use	  them	  for	  recognizing	  a	  speaker’s	  token	  informative	  intention.	  To	  illustrate,	  take	  an	  example	  cited	  by	  McNeill	  (2005:26),	  in	  which	  a	  speaker	  says	  
and	  he	  came	  out	  the	  pipe	  while	  doing	  an	  ‘up-­‐and-­‐down	  away’	  hand	  gesture	  (the	  hand	  is	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  body	  as	  it	  is	  moved	  repeatedly	  up	  and	  down).	  Hearing	  came	  out,	  an	  interpreter	  recognizes	  these	  sounds	  to	  be	  tokens	  of	  types	  (i.e.,	  with	  the	  meaning	  ‘came	  out’).	  He	  or	  she	  may	  also	  enrich	  this	  meaning	  ‘came	  out’	  in	  using	  it	  as	  a	  clue	  for	  figuring	  out	  the	  speaker’s	  informative	  intention	  in	  producing	  this	  composite	  utterance.	  They	  may	  of	  course	  exploit	  the	  accompanying	  gesture	  in	  this	  process	  of	  enrichment.	  In	  the	  experiment	  described	  by	  McNeill,	  a	  subject	  who	  heard	  the	  first	  speaker’s	  description	  of	  the	  scene	  as	  and	  he	  came	  out	  the	  pipe[GESTURE-­‐up-­‐and-­‐down-­‐away]	  later	  re-­‐describes	  it	  as	  the	  
cat	  bounces	  out	  the	  pipe.	  Note	  that	  the	  re-­‐teller	  not	  only	  enriches	  came	  out[GESTURE-­‐up-­‐and-­‐down-­‐away]	  as	  ‘bounces	  out’,	  he	  also	  enriches	  he	  as	  ‘the	  cat’;	  concerning	  the	  pronoun	  he	  in	  the	  original	  utterance,	  the	  subject	  must	  have	  both	  recognized	  he	  as	  a	  token	  of	  the	  type	  ‘he’,	  which	  stands	  in	  this	  case	  for	  a	  token	  informative	  intention	  ‘the	  cat’.	  This	  shows	  that	  both	  the	  gesture	  and	  the	  words	  are	  enriched	  by	  their	  co-­‐occurrence	  in	  that	  context,	  being	  taken	  to	  be	  co-­‐occurring	  signs	  of	  a	  single	  informative	  intention.	  Came	  out	  and	  [GESTURE-­‐up-­‐and-­‐down-­‐away]	  together	  point	  to	  a	  single	  idea	  ‘bounces	  out’.	  While	  word	  recognition	  has	  no	  analogue	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  iconic	  gesture	  here	  (since	  the	  gesture	  is	  a	  token	  but	  not	  a	  token	  of	  a	  type),	  attribution	  of	  overall	  utterance-­‐intention	  of	  words	  does	  have	  an	  analogue	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  gesture.	  	  	  When	  examining	  gesture,	  as	  when	  examining	  any	  other	  component	  of	  composite	  utterances,	  we	  must	  carefully	  distinguish	  between	  token	  meaning	  (enriched,	  context-­‐situated),	  type	  meaning	  (raw,	  context-­‐independent,	  pre-­‐packaged),	  and	  sheer	  form	  (no	  necessary	  meaning	  at	  all	  outside	  of	  a	  particular	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  meaning).	  These	  distinctions	  may	  apply	  to	  signs	  in	  any	  modality.	  	   	  




	  1.4.5	  Elements	  of	  composite	  utterances	  	  Based	  on	  the	  discussion	  so	  far,	  we	  may	  define	  the	  composite	  utterance	  as	  a	  communicative	  move	  that	  incorporates	  multiple	  signs	  of	  multiple	  types.	  Sources	  of	  these	  types	  of	  sign	  are	  given	  in	  Figure	  1.3	  (cf.	  Levinson	  1983:14,	  131,	  Hanks	  1990:51ff).	  	  
I.	  Encoded	  	   	   I.1.	  Lexical	  (open	  class,	  symbolic)	  	   	   I.2.	  Grammatical	  (closed	  class,	  symbolic-­‐indexical)	  
II.	  Enriched	  	   	   II.1.	  Indexical	  resolution	  
II.1.1	  Explicit	  (via	  symbolic	  indexicals,	  e.g.,	  pointing	  or	  
demonstratives)	  
	   	   	   II.1.2	  Implicit	  (e.g.,	  from	  physical	  situation)	  	  	   	   II.2.	  Implicature	  
	   	   	   II.2.1	  From	  code	  
II.2.2	  From	  context	  
	  Figure	  1.3.	  Sources	  of	  composite	  meaning	  for	  interpretation	  of	  communicative	  moves.	  ‘Encoded’	  =	  conventional	  sign	  components.	  ‘Enriched’	  =	  non-­‐conventional	  token	  meanings	  drawing	  on	  context.	  	  In	  Figure	  1.3,	  ‘encoded	  meaning’	  encompasses	  both	  lexical	  and	  grammatical	  meaning.	  Grammatical	  signs	  show	  greater	  indexicality	  because	  they	  signify	  context-­‐specific	  ties	  between	  two	  or	  more	  elements	  of	  a	  composite	  utterance	  (e.g.,	  grammatical	  agreement,	  case-­‐marking,	  etc.)	  or	  between	  the	  speech	  event	  and	  a	  narrated	  event	  (Jakobson	  1971;	  e.g.,	  through	  tense-­‐marking,	  spatial	  deixis,	  etc.)	  ‘Indexical	  enrichment’	  refers	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  reference	  left	  open	  either	  explicitly	  (e.g.,	  through	  symbolic	  indexicals	  like	  this)	  or	  implicitly	  (e.g.,	  by	  simple	  co-­‐placement	  in	  space	  or	  time;	  thus,	  a	  ‘no	  smoking’	  sign	  need	  not	  specify	  ‘no	  smoking	  here’).	  ‘Enrichment	  through	  implicature’	  refers	  to	  Gricean	  token	  understandings,	  arising	  either	  through	  rational	  interpretation	  based	  on	  knowledge	  of	  a	  restricted	  system	  of	  code	  (i.e.,	  informativeness	  scales	  and	  other	  mechanisms	  for	  Generalized	  Conversational	  Implicature;	  Levinson	  2000),	  or	  through	  rational	  interpretation	  based	  on	  cultural	  or	  personal	  common	  ground	  (e.g.,	  Particularized	  Conversational	  Implicatures	  such	  as	  those	  based	  on	  a	  maxim	  of	  relevance;	  Sperber	  and	  Wilson	  1995).	  	  Thus,	  composite	  utterances	  are	  interpreted	  through	  the	  recognition	  and	  bringing	  together	  of	  these	  multiple	  signs	  under	  a	  pragmatic	  unity	  heuristic	  or	  co-­‐relevance	  principle,	  i.e.,	  an	  interpreter’s	  steadfast	  presumption	  of	  pragmatic	  unity	  despite	  semiotic	  complexity.	  	  	  	  	  




1.5	  Sign	  filtration:	  triggers	  and	  heuristics	  	  The	  taxonomy	  of	  elements	  of	  composite	  signs	  in	  Figure	  1.3	  presupposes	  that	  an	  interpreter	  can	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  sign	  filtration,	  i.e.,	  that	  they	  can	  parse	  out	  from	  a	  flux	  of	  impressions	  those	  things	  that	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  signs	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  filtration	  is	  assisted	  by	  triggers	  which	  direct	  us	  to	  lock	  on	  to	  certain	  signs,	  constraining	  the	  search	  space.	  An	  important	  trigger	  is	  that	  a	  perceptible	  impression	  must	  be	  recognizable	  as	  addressed,	  that	  is,	  being	  produced	  by	  a	  person	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  interpretation	  by	  another.	  Conventional	  signs	  like	  words	  have	  this	  addressed-­‐ness	  by	  their	  very	  nature.	  But	  other	  perceptibles	  are	  only	  potential	  signs,	  and	  their	  addressed-­‐ness	  needs	  to	  be	  specially	  marked.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  means	  of	  attention-­‐drawing	  indexicals	  (hand	  pointing,	  saying	  ‘like	  this’,	  etc.),	  by	  sheer	  spatiotemporal	  co-­‐occurrence,	  or	  by	  special	  diacritic	  marking	  (see	  Figures	  1.1	  and	  1.2,	  above).	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  discussed	  in	  Enfield	  2009,	  Chapter	  3,	  where	  movements	  of	  the	  face	  and	  head	  can	  serve	  as	  triggers	  for	  eye	  gaze	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  pointing,	  not	  merely	  as	  looking.	  In	  yet	  other	  cases,	  interpreters	  can	  employ	  abductive,	  rational	  interpretation	  to	  detect	  that	  an	  action	  is	  done	  with	  a	  communicative	  intention	  (Peirce	  1955,	  Grice	  1957).	  For	  instance,	  if	  you	  open	  a	  jar	  I	  may	  be	  unlikely	  to	  take	  this	  to	  be	  communicative,	  but	  if	  you	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  physical	  action	  without	  an	  actual	  jar	  in	  your	  hands,	  the	  lack	  of	  conceivable	  practical	  aim	  is	  likely	  to	  act	  as	  a	  trigger	  for	  implicature	  (Levinson	  1983:157,	  Gergely	  et	  al	  2002).	  	  	  Data	  of	  the	  kind	  presented	  throughout	  this	  handbook	  do	  not	  usually	  present	  special	  difficulties	  for	  interpreters	  in	  detecting	  communicative	  intention	  or	  identifying	  which	  signs	  to	  include	  when	  interpreting	  a	  composite	  utterance.	  Mostly,	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  language	  being	  used	  triggers	  a	  process	  of	  interpretation,	  and	  the	  gestures	  which	  accompany	  speech	  are	  straightforwardly	  taken	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  what	  a	  speaker	  is	  saying	  (Kendon	  2004).	  Hand	  gestures	  are	  therefore	  available	  for	  inclusion	  in	  a	  unified	  utterance	  interpretation,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  take	  them	  to	  have	  been	  intended	  to	  communicate.	  	  Note	  the	  kinds	  of	  heuristics	  that	  are	  likely	  being	  used	  in	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  sign	  filtration.	  (On	  heuristics	  and	  bounded	  rationality	  in	  general	  see	  Gigerenzer	  et	  al	  2011	  and	  references	  therein.)	  By	  a	  convention	  heuristic,	  if	  a	  form	  is	  recognizable	  as	  a	  socially	  conventionalized	  type	  of	  sign,	  assume	  that	  it	  stands	  for	  its	  socially	  conventional	  meaning.	  Symbols	  like	  words	  may	  thus	  be	  considered	  as	  pre-­‐fabricated	  semiotic	  processes:	  their	  very	  existence	  is	  due	  to	  their	  role	  in	  communication	  (unlike	  iconic-­‐indexical	  relations	  which	  may	  exist	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  interpretants).	  By	  an	  orientation	  heuristic,	  if	  a	  signer	  is	  bodily	  oriented	  toward	  you,	  most	  obviously	  by	  body	  position	  and	  eye	  gaze,	  assume	  they	  are	  addressing	  you.	  By	  a	  contextual	  association	  heuristic,	  if	  two	  signs	  are	  contextually	  associated,	  assume	  they	  are	  part	  of	  one	  signifying	  action.	  Triggers	  for	  contextual	  association	  are	  timing	  and	  other	  types	  of	  indexical	  proximity	  (e.g.,	  placing	  caption	  and	  picture	  together,	  placing	  word	  and	  gesture	  together).	  By	  a	  unified	  utterance-­‐meaning	  heuristic,	  assume	  that	  contextually	  associated	  signs	  point	  to	  a	  unified,	  single,	  addressed	  utterance-­‐meaning.	  And	  by	  an	  agency	  heuristic,	  if	  a	  signer	  has	  greater	  control	  over	  a	  behaviour,	  assume	  (all	  things	  being	  equal)	  that	  




this	  sign	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  communicatively	  intended.	  Language	  scores	  higher	  than	  gesture	  on	  a	  range	  of	  measures	  of	  agency	  (Kockelman	  2007).	  For	  further	  elaboration	  on	  the	  application	  of	  a	  heuristic	  model	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  speech-­‐gesture	  composites,	  see	  Enfield	  (2009:223-­‐7).	  	  1.6	  Semiotic	  analysis	  of	  gestures	  	  Like	  any	  signs,	  hand	  movements	  can	  stand	  for	  things	  in	  three	  essential	  ways	  (often	  in	  combination),	  referred	  to	  by	  Peirce	  (1955)	  as	  types	  of	  ground:	  iconic,	  indexical,	  symbolic.	  These	  crucial	  yet	  widely	  mishandled	  distinctions	  are	  defined	  as	  follows.	  A	  relation	  of	  a	  sign	  standing	  for	  an	  object	  is	  iconic	  when	  the	  sign	  is	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  object	  because	  it	  has	  perceptible	  qualities	  in	  common	  with	  it.	  The	  sign	  is	  indexical	  when	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  an	  object	  because	  it	  has	  a	  relation	  of	  actual	  contiguity	  (spatial,	  temporal,	  or	  causal)	  with	  that	  object.	  The	  relation	  is	  symbolic	  when	  the	  sign	  is	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  an	  object	  because	  of	  a	  norm	  in	  the	  community	  that	  this	  sign	  shall	  be	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  this	  object.	  These	  three	  types	  of	  ground	  are	  not	  exclusive,	  but	  co-­‐occur.	  In	  the	  example	  of	  a	  fingerprint	  on	  the	  murder	  weapon,	  the	  print	  is	  iconic	  and	  indexical.	  It	  is	  iconic	  in	  that	  the	  print	  has	  qualities	  in	  common	  with	  the	  pattern	  on	  the	  killer’s	  actual	  fingertip	  and	  in	  this	  way	  it	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  fingertip.	  It	  is	  indexical	  in	  that	  (a)	  it	  was	  directly	  caused	  by	  the	  fingertip	  making	  an	  impression	  on	  the	  weapon	  (thus	  a	  sign	  standing	  for	  an	  event	  of	  handling	  it),	  and	  (b)	  the	  fingertip	  of	  the	  killer	  is	  in	  contiguity	  with	  the	  whole	  killer	  (thus	  a	  sign	  standing	  for	  the	  killer	  himself).	  Standard	  taxonomies	  of	  gesture	  types	  (McNeill	  1992,	  Kendon	  2004,	  inter	  alia)	  are	  fully	  explicable	  in	  terms	  of	  these	  types	  of	  semiotic	  ground,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.4.	  	  	  Figure	  1.4	  HERE	  	  An	  exhaustive	  analysis	  of	  the	  semiotics	  of	  hand	  gestures	  will	  need	  to	  systematically	  explore	  their	  values	  on	  the	  many	  parameters	  along	  which	  signs	  differ:	  formal	  segmentability,	  stability	  across	  populations,	  evanescence	  or	  persistence	  in	  time	  from	  production,	  symmetry	  of	  perceptual	  access	  for	  producer	  and	  interpreter,	  relative	  immediacy	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  production	  and	  interpretation,	  portability,	  combinatorics,	  information	  structure	  (cf.	  Kockelman	  2005:240–241).	  This	  will	  entail	  teasing	  apart	  the	  large	  set	  of	  distinct	  semiotic	  dimensions	  which	  hand	  movements	  incorporate	  (Talmy	  2006;	  cf.	  de	  Ruiter	  et	  al	  2003).	  For	  example,	  upon	  uttering	  a	  word,	  the	  human	  voice	  can	  simultaneously	  vary	  many	  distinct	  features	  of	  a	  speaker’s	  identity	  (sex,	  age,	  origin,	  state	  of	  arousal,	  individual	  identity,	  etc.),	  along	  with	  pitch,	  loudness,	  among	  other	  things.	  What	  makes	  pitch	  and	  loudness	  distinct	  semiotic	  dimensions	  is	  that	  pitch	  and	  loudness	  can	  be	  varied	  independently	  of	  each	  other.	  But	  loudness	  is	  a	  single	  dimension,	  because	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  produce	  a	  word	  simultaneously	  at	  two	  different	  volumes.	  Hand	  movements	  are	  well	  suited	  to	  iconic-­‐indexical	  meaning	  thanks	  to	  their	  rich	  potential	  for	  sharing	  perceptible	  qualities	  in	  common	  with	  physical	  objects	  and	  events.	  But	  they	  are	  not	  at	  all	  confined	  to	  these	  types	  of	  meaning.	  As	  Wilkins	  writes,	  ‘[the]	  analog	  and	  suprasegmental	  or	  synthetic	  nature	  [of	  gestures]	  does	  not	  make	  them	  any	  less	  subject	  to	  convention,	  and	  does	  not	  




deny	  them	  combinatorial	  constraints	  or	  rules	  of	  structural	  form’	  (Wilkins	  2006:132).	  For	  example,	  in	  some	  communities,	  ‘the	  demonstration	  of	  the	  length	  of	  something	  with	  two	  outstretched	  hands	  may	  require	  a	  flat	  hand	  for	  the	  length	  of	  objects	  with	  volume	  (like	  a	  beam	  of	  wood)	  and	  the	  extended	  index	  fingers	  for	  the	  length	  of	  essentially	  linear	  objects	  lacking	  significant	  volume	  (e.g.	  string	  or	  wire).’	  (ibid.)	  A	  similar	  example	  is	  a	  Lao	  speaker’s	  conventional	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  sizes	  of	  fish,	  by	  using	  the	  hand	  or	  hands	  to	  encircle	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  a	  tapering	  tubular	  body	  part	  such	  as	  the	  forearm,	  calf,	  or	  thigh.	  This	  is	  taken	  as	  standing	  for	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  fish.	  	  Another	  kind	  of	  conventionality	  in	  gestures	  concerns	  types	  of	  communicative	  practice	  like,	  say,	  ‘tracing’	  in	  mid	  air	  as	  a	  way	  of	  illustrating	  or	  diagramming	  (Mandel	  1977,	  Kendon	  1988,	  Enfield	  2009:	  Chapter	  6).	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  conventions	  which	  allow	  interpreters	  to	  recognize	  that	  a	  person	  is	  doing	  an	  illustrative	  tracing	  gesture,	  based	  presumably	  on	  formal	  distinctions	  in	  types	  of	  hand	  movement	  in	  combination	  with	  attention-­‐directing	  eye	  gaze	  toward	  the	  gesture	  space.	  While	  the	  exact	  form	  of	  a	  tracing	  gesture	  cannot	  be	  pre-­‐specified,	  its	  general	  manner	  of	  execution	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  signal	  that	  it	  is	  a	  tracing	  gesture.	  	  Most	  important	  is	  the	  collaborative,	  public,	  socially	  strategic	  nature	  of	  the	  process	  of	  constructing	  composite	  utterances	  (Goodwin	  2000,	  Streeck	  2009).	  These	  communicative	  moves	  are	  not	  merely	  designed	  but	  designed	  for,	  and	  with,	  anticipated	  interpreters.	  They	  are	  not	  merely	  indices	  of	  cognitive	  processes,	  they	  
constitute	  cognitive	  processes.	  They	  are	  distributed,	  publicized,	  and	  intersubjectively	  grounded.	  Each	  type	  of	  composite	  utterance	  discussed	  in	  this	  book	  is	  regulated	  by	  its	  producer’s	  aim	  not	  just	  to	  convey	  some	  meaning	  but	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  desired	  understanding	  in	  a	  social	  other.	  So,	  like	  all	  instruments	  of	  meaning,	  these	  composites	  are	  not	  bipolar	  form-­‐meaning	  mappings,	  or	  mere	  word-­‐to-­‐world	  glue,	  they	  are	  premised	  on	  a	  triadic,	  cooperative	  activity	  consisting	  of	  a	  speaker,	  an	  addressee,	  and	  what	  the	  speaker	  is	  trying	  to	  say.	  	  1.7.	  Conclusion	  and	  prospects	  	  In	  solving	  the	  ever-­‐present	  puzzle	  of	  figuring	  out	  what	  others	  are	  trying	  to	  say,	  our	  evidence	  comes	  in	  chunks:	  composite	  utterances	  built	  from	  multiple	  signs	  of	  multiple	  types.	  These	  composites	  are	  produced	  by	  people	  in	  trajectories	  of	  collaborative	  social	  activity.	  As	  communicative	  behaviours,	  they	  are	  strategic,	  context-­‐embedded	  efforts	  to	  make	  social	  goals	  recognizable.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  how	  people	  interpret	  such	  efforts,	  our	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis	  must	  be	  the	  utterance	  or	  move,	  the	  single	  increment	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  social	  interaction.	  Component	  signs	  will	  only	  make	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  move	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  moves	  built	  from	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  as	  a	  sample	  domain	  for	  exploring	  the	  anatomy	  of	  meaning.	  But	  the	  analytic	  requirement	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  composite	  utterances	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture.	  Because	  all	  utterances	  are	  composite	  in	  kind,	  our	  findings	  on	  speech-­‐with-­‐




gesture	  should	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  meaning	  more	  generally.	  This	  is	  because	  research	  on	  the	  comprehension	  of	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  is	  a	  sub-­‐field	  of	  a	  more	  general	  pursuit:	  to	  learn	  how	  it	  is	  that	  interpreters	  understand	  token	  contributions	  to	  situated	  sequences	  of	  social	  interaction	  (cf.	  Schegloff	  1968,	  Goffman	  1981,	  Goodwin	  2000,	  Streeck	  2009).	  	  	  How	  are	  multiple	  signs	  brought	  together	  in	  unified	  interpretations?	  The	  issue	  was	  framed	  above	  in	  terms	  of	  semiotic	  function	  of	  a	  composite’s	  distinct	  components	  (see	  Figure	  1.4).	  A	  broad	  distinction	  was	  made	  between	  conventional	  meaning	  and	  non-­‐conventional	  meaning,	  where	  these	  two	  may	  be	  joined	  by	  indexical	  mechanisms	  of	  various	  kinds.	  Think	  of	  a	  painting	  hanging	  in	  a	  gallery:	  a	  title	  (words,	  conventional)	  is	  taken	  to	  belong	  with	  an	  image	  (an	  arrangement	  of	  paint,	  non-­‐conventional)	  via	  indexical	  links	  (spatial	  co-­‐placement	  on	  a	  gallery	  wall,	  putative	  source	  in	  a	  single	  creator	  and	  single	  act	  of	  creation).	  Speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  can	  be	  analyzed	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  When	  a	  man	  says	  Make	  it	  steep	  like	  this	  with	  eye	  gaze	  fixed	  on	  his	  arm	  held	  at	  an	  angle	  (see	  Figure	  1.1),	  the	  conventional	  signs	  of	  his	  speech	  are	  joined	  to	  the	  non-­‐conventional	  sign	  of	  his	  arm	  gesture	  by	  means	  of	  indexical	  devices	  including	  temporal	  co-­‐placement,	  source	  in	  a	  single	  producer,	  eye	  gaze,	  and	  the	  symbolic	  indexical	  expression	  like	  this.	  In	  these	  ‘illustrative	  gesture’	  cases,	  hand	  movements	  constitute	  the	  non-­‐conventional	  ‘image’	  component	  of	  the	  utterance.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  cases	  of	  ‘deictic	  gesture’	  or	  pointing,	  hand	  movement	  is	  what	  provides	  the	  indexical	  link	  between	  words	  and	  an	  image	  or	  thing	  in	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  a	  person	  walking	  by,	  or	  diagrams	  in	  ink	  or	  mid-­‐air.	  	  This	  semiotic	  framework	  permits	  systematic	  comparison	  of	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  moves	  to	  other	  species	  of	  composite	  utterance.	  An	  important	  case	  is	  sign	  language	  of	  the	  Deaf.	  There	  is	  considerable	  controversy	  as	  to	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  gesture	  and	  sign	  language	  are	  to	  be	  compared	  (cf.	  Emmorey	  and	  Reilly	  1995).	  The	  present	  account	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  visible	  components	  of	  a	  sign	  language	  utterance	  cannot	  be	  compared	  directly	  to	  the	  visible	  hand	  movements	  that	  accompany	  speech,	  nor	  to	  mere	  speech	  alone	  (i.e.,	  with	  visible	  hand	  movements	  subtracted),	  but	  may	  only	  be	  properly	  compared	  to	  the	  entire	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composite	  (cf.	  Okrent	  2002,	  Liddell	  2003).	  The	  unit	  of	  comparison	  in	  both	  cases	  must	  be	  the	  move.	  By	  the	  analysis	  advanced	  here,	  different	  components	  of	  a	  move	  in	  sign	  language	  will	  have	  different	  semiotic	  functions,	  in	  the	  sense	  just	  discussed:	  conventional	  signs	  with	  non-­‐conventional	  signs,	  linked	  indexically.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  sign	  language	  ‘classifier	  constructions’	  or	  ‘depicting	  verbs’	  (Liddell	  2003:261ff).	  In	  a	  typical	  construction	  of	  this	  kind,	  a	  single	  articulator	  (the	  hand)	  will	  be	  the	  vehicle	  for	  both	  a	  conventional	  sign	  component	  (a	  conventionalized	  hand	  shape	  such	  as	  the	  ASL	  ‘vehicle	  classifier’)	  and	  a	  non-­‐conventional	  sign	  component	  (some	  path	  of	  movement,	  often	  relative	  to	  a	  contextually	  established	  set	  of	  token	  spatial	  referents),	  where	  linking	  indexical	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  spatio-­‐temporal	  co-­‐placement	  and	  source	  in	  single	  creator	  are	  maximized	  through	  instantiation	  in	  single	  sign	  vehicle,	  i.e.,	  one	  and	  the	  same	  hand.	  	  




Another	  domain	  in	  which	  a	  general	  composite	  utterance	  analysis	  should	  fit	  is	  in	  linguistic	  research	  on	  syntax.	  Syntactic	  constructions,	  too,	  are	  made	  up	  of	  multiple	  signs,	  where	  these	  are	  mostly	  the	  conventional	  signs	  of	  morphemes	  and	  constructions	  (though	  note	  of	  course	  that	  many	  grammatical	  morphemes	  are	  symbolic	  indexicals).	  An	  increasingly	  popular	  view	  of	  syntax	  takes	  lexical	  items	  (words,	  morphemes)	  and	  grammatical	  configurations	  (constructions)	  to	  be	  instances	  of	  the	  same	  thing:	  linguistic	  signs	  (Langacker	  1987,	  Goldberg	  1995,	  Croft	  2001).	  From	  this	  ‘construction	  grammar’	  viewpoint,	  interpretation	  of	  speech-­‐only	  utterances	  should	  be	  just	  as	  for	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture.	  It	  means	  dealing	  with	  multiple,	  simultaneously	  occurring	  signs	  (e.g.,	  That	  guy	  may	  be	  both	  noun	  phrase	  and	  sentential	  subject),	  and	  looking	  to	  determine	  an	  overall	  target	  meaning	  for	  the	  communicative	  move	  that	  these	  signs	  are	  converging	  to	  signify.	  A	  difference	  is	  that	  while	  semantic	  relations	  within	  grammatical	  structures	  are	  often	  narrowly	  determined	  by	  conventions	  like	  word	  order,	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  appear	  to	  involve	  simple	  co-­‐occurrence	  of	  signs,	  with	  no	  special	  formal	  instruction	  for	  interpreters	  as	  to	  how	  their	  meanings	  are	  to	  be	  unified.	  Because	  of	  this	  extreme	  under-­‐determination	  of	  semiotic	  relation	  between,	  say,	  a	  gesture	  and	  its	  accompanying	  speech,	  many	  researchers	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  no	  systematic	  combinatorics	  in	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture.	  But	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  are	  merely	  a	  limiting	  case	  in	  the	  range	  of	  ways	  that	  signs	  combine:	  all	  an	  interpreter	  knows	  is	  that	  these	  signs	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  together,	  but	  there	  may	  be	  no	  conventionally	  coded	  constraints	  on	  how.	  Such	  under-­‐determination	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  gesture.	  In	  language,	  too,	  we	  find	  minimal	  interpretive	  constraints	  on	  syntactic	  combinations	  within	  the	  clause,	  as	  documented	  for	  example	  by	  Gil	  (2005)	  for	  the	  extreme	  forms	  of	  isolating	  grammar	  found	  in	  some	  spoken	  languages.	  And	  beyond	  the	  clause	  level,	  such	  under-­‐determined	  relations	  are	  the	  standard	  fabric	  of	  textual	  cohesion	  (Halliday	  and	  Hasan	  1976).	  	  In	  sum,	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  of	  interpreting	  any	  type	  of	  composite	  utterance,	  we	  should	  not	  begin	  with	  components	  like	  ‘noun’,	  ‘rising	  intonation’,	  or	  ‘pointing	  gesture’.	  We	  begin	  instead	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  whole	  utterance,	  a	  complete	  unit	  of	  social	  action	  which	  always	  has	  multiple	  components,	  which	  is	  always	  embedded	  in	  a	  sequential	  context	  (simultaneously	  an	  effect	  of	  something	  prior	  and	  a	  cause	  of	  something	  next),	  and	  whose	  interpretation	  always	  draws	  on	  both	  conventional	  and	  non-­‐conventional	  signs,	  joined	  indexically	  as	  wholes.	  	  Research	  on	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  yields	  ample	  motivation	  to	  question	  the	  standard	  focus	  in	  mainstream	  linguistics	  on	  competence	  and	  static	  representations	  of	  meaning	  (as	  opposed	  to	  performance	  and	  dynamic	  processes	  of	  meaning;	  see	  McNeill	  2005:64ff,	  Wilkins	  2006:140–141).	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  due	  attention	  to	  meaning	  at	  a	  context-­‐situated	  token	  level,	  a	  stance	  preferred	  by	  many	  functionalist	  linguists,	  linguistic	  anthropologists,	  conversational	  analysts,	  and	  some	  gesture	  researchers.	  Speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  quickly	  make	  this	  need	  apparent,	  because	  they	  force	  us	  to	  examine	  singularities,	  i.e.,	  semiotic	  structures	  that	  are	  tokens	  but	  not	  tokens-­‐of-­‐types.	  These	  singularities	  include	  non-­‐conventional	  gestures	  as	  utterance	  components,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  overall	  utterances	  themselves,	  each	  a	  unique	  combination	  of	  signs.	  This	  is	  why,	  for	  instance,	  Kendon	  writes	  of	  speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  composites	  that	  ‘it	  is	  only	  by	  




studying	  them	  as	  they	  appear	  within	  situations	  of	  interaction	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  how	  they	  serve	  in	  communication’	  (2004:47–8;	  see	  also	  Hanks	  1990,	  1996	  among	  many	  others).	  Here	  is	  the	  key	  point:	  What	  Kendon	  writes	  is	  already	  true	  of	  speech	  whether	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  gesture	  or	  not.	  Speech-­‐with-­‐gesture	  teaches	  us	  to	  treat	  utterances	  as	  dynamic,	  motivated,	  concrete,	  and	  context-­‐bound,	  which	  is	  the	  stance	  we	  need	  for	  the	  proper	  treatment	  of	  communicative	  moves	  more	  generally.	  By	  studying	  gesture	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  we	  study	  meaning	  better.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Acknowledgement.	  The	  text	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  drawn	  from	  chapters	  1	  and	  8	  of	  ‘The	  
Anatomy	  of	  Meaning:	  Speech,	  gesture,	  and	  Composite	  Utterances’	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2009),	  with	  revisions.	  I	  gratefully	  acknowledge	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press	  for	  permission	  to	  reproduce	  those	  sections	  here.	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  
thank	  Cornelia	  Müller	  for	  her	  encouragement,	  guidance,	  and	  patience.	  	   	  






	  	  	  Atkinson,	  J.	  Maxwell,	  and	  John	  Heritage.	  1984.	  Structures	  of	  Social	  Action:	  Studies	  
in	  Conversation	  Analysis.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Atlas,	  Jay	  D.	  2005.	  Logic,	  Meaning,	  and	  Conversation:	  Semantical	  
Underdeterminacy,	  Implicature,	  and	  Their	  Interface.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Austin,	  J.	  L.	  1962.	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  with	  Words.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Bates,	  Elizabeth,	  O’Connell.	  B.,	  and	  Cecilia	  M.	  Shore.	  1987.	  “Language	  and	  Communication	  in	  Infancy.”	  In	  Handbook	  of	  Infant	  Competence	  (second	  
Edition),	  ed.	  J.	  D.	  Osofsky,	  149–203.	  New	  York:	  Wiley	  and	  Sons.	  Bates,	  Elizabeth,	  Luigia	  Camaioni,	  and	  Virginia	  Volterra.	  1975.	  “The	  Acquisition	  of	  Performatives	  Prior	  to	  Speech.”	  Merril-­‐Palmer	  Quarterly	  21:	  205–224.	  Brandom,	  Robert	  B.	  1979.	  “Freedom	  and	  Constraint	  by	  Norms.”	  American	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly	  16	  (3):	  187–196.	  Brookes,	  Heather.	  2004.	  “A	  Repertoire	  of	  South	  African	  Quotable	  Gestures.”	  
Journal	  of	  Linguistic	  Anthropology	  14	  (2):	  186–224.	  Bühler,	  Karl.	  1982.	  “The	  Deictic	  Field	  of	  Language	  and	  Deictic	  Words.”	  In	  Speech,	  
Place,	  and	  Action,	  ed.	  Robert	  J.	  Jarvella	  and	  Wolfgang	  Klein,	  9–30.	  Chichester:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons.	  Chafe,	  Wallace.	  1994.	  Discourse,	  Consciousness,	  and	  Time:	  The	  Flow	  and	  
Displacement	  of	  Conscious	  Experience	  in	  Speaking	  and	  Writing.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Clark,	  Herbert	  H.	  1996.	  Using	  Language.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Colapietro,	  Vincent	  M.	  1989.	  Peirce’s	  Approach	  to	  the	  Self:	  a	  Semiotic	  Perspective	  
on	  Human	  Subjectivity.	  Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press.	  Croft,	  William.	  2001.	  Radical	  Construction	  Grammar:	  Syntactic	  Theory	  in	  
Typological	  Perspective.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Cruse,	  D.	  Alan.	  1986.	  Lexical	  Semantics.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Ekman,	  Paul,	  and	  Wallace	  V.	  Friesen.	  1969.	  “The	  Repertoire	  of	  Nonverbal	  Behavior:	  Origins,	  Usage,	  and	  Coding.”	  Semiotica	  1:	  49–98.	  Emmorey,	  Karen,	  and	  Judy	  S.	  Reilly.	  1995.	  Language,	  Gesture,	  and	  Space.	  Hillsdale,	  NJ:	  Erlbaum.	  Enfield,	  N.	  J.	  2009.	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Meaning:	  Speech,	  Gesture,	  and	  Composite	  
Utterances.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Enfield,	  N.	  J.,	  and	  Stephen	  C.	  Levinson.	  2006.	  “Introduction:	  Human	  Sociality	  as	  a	  New	  Interdisciplinary	  Field.”	  In	  Roots	  of	  Human	  Sociality:	  Culture,	  
Cognition,	  and	  Interaction,	  ed.	  N.	  J.	  Enfield	  and	  Stephen	  C.	  Levinson,	  1–38.	  Oxford:	  Berg.	  Engle,	  Randi	  A.	  1998.	  “Not	  Channels	  but	  Composite	  Signals:	  Speech,	  Gesture,	  Diagrams	  and	  Object	  Demonstrations	  Are	  Integrated	  in	  Multimodal	  Explanations.”	  In	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  
Cognitive	  Science	  Society,	  ed.	  M.	  A.	  Gernsbacher	  and	  S.	  J.	  Derry,	  321–327.	  Mahwah:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum.	  




Fillmore,	  Charles	  J.	  1997.	  Lectures	  on	  Deixis.	  Stanford:	  CSLI	  Publications.	  Foley,	  William	  A.,	  and	  Robert	  D.	  Van	  Valin	  Jr.	  1984.	  Functional	  Syntax	  and	  
Universal	  Grammar.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Frege,	  Gottlob.	  1892.	  “On	  Sense	  and	  Reference.”	  In	  Translations	  from	  the	  
Philosophical	  Writings	  of	  Gottlob	  Frege,	  ed.	  P.	  Geach	  and	  M.	  Black,	  56–78.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  Frith,	  Chris	  D.,	  and	  Uta	  Frith.	  2007.	  “Social	  Cognition	  in	  Humans.”	  Current	  Biology	  17:	  R724–R732.	  Gergely,	  György,	  Harold	  Bekkering,	  and	  Ildikó	  Király.	  2002.	  “Developmental	  Psychology:	  Rational	  Imitation	  in	  Preverbal	  Infants.”	  Nature	  415:	  755.	  Gigerenzer,	  Gerd,	  Ralph	  Hertwig,	  and	  Thorsten	  Pachur,	  eds.	  2011.	  Heuristics:	  The	  
Foundations	  of	  Adaptive	  Behavior.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Gil,	  David.	  in	  press.	  “Isolating-­‐monocategorial-­‐associational	  Language.”	  In	  
Categorization	  in	  Cognitive	  Science,	  ed.	  H.	  Cohen	  and	  C.	  Lefebvre.	  Amsterdam:	  Elsevier.	  Goffman,	  Erving.	  1964.	  “The	  Neglected	  Situation.”	  American	  Anthropologist	  66	  (6):	  133–136.	  ———.	  1981.	  Forms	  of	  Talk.	  Philadelphia,	  PA:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press.	  Goldberg,	  Adele	  E.	  1995.	  Constructions:	  a	  Construction	  Grammar	  Approach	  to	  
Argument	  Structure.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Goodwin,	  Charles.	  2000.	  “Action	  and	  Embodiment	  Within	  Situated	  Human	  Interaction.”	  Journal	  of	  Pragmatics	  32:	  1489–1522.	  Grice,	  H.	  P.	  1957.	  “Meaning.”	  Philosophical	  Review	  67:	  377–388.	  Grice,	  H.	  Paul.	  1989.	  Studies	  in	  the	  Way	  of	  Words.	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Grice,	  H.	  Paul.	  1975.	  “Logic	  and	  Conversation.”	  In	  Speech	  Acts,	  ed.	  Peter	  Cole	  and	  Jerry	  L.	  Morgan,	  41–58.	  New	  York:	  Academic	  Press.	  Halliday,	  Michael	  A.	  K.,	  and	  Ruqaiya	  Hasan.	  1976.	  Cohesion	  in	  English.	  London:	  Longman.	  Hanks,	  William	  F.	  1990.	  Referential	  Practice:	  Language	  and	  Lived	  Space	  Among	  
the	  Maya.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  ———.	  1996.	  Language	  and	  Communicative	  Practices.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press.	  Horn,	  Laurence	  R.	  1989.	  A	  Natural	  History	  of	  Negation.	  Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press.	  Hutton,	  Christopher	  M.	  1990.	  Abstraction	  and	  Instance:	  The	  Type-­‐token	  Relation	  
in	  Linguistic	  Theory.	  Oxford:	  Pergamon	  Press.	  Jackendoff,	  Ray.	  1983.	  Semantics	  and	  Cognition.	  Cambridge,	  Mass:	  MIT	  Press.	  Jakobson,	  Roman.	  1971.	  “Shifters,	  Verbals	  Categories,	  and	  the	  Russian	  Verb.”	  In	  
Selected	  Writings	  II:	  Word	  and	  Language,	  ed.	  Roman	  Jakobson,	  130–147.	  The	  Hague	  and	  Paris:	  Mouton.	  Kendon,	  Adam.	  1988.	  Sign	  Languages	  of	  Aboriginal	  Australia:	  Cultural,	  Semiotic	  
and	  Communicative	  Perspectives.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  2004.	  Gesture:	  Visible	  Action	  as	  Utterance.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Kita,	  Sotaro.	  2000.	  “How	  Representational	  Gestures	  Help	  Speaking.”	  In	  Language	  
and	  Gesture,	  ed.	  David	  McNeill,	  162–185.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  




———.	  2003.	  Pointing:	  Where	  Language,	  Cognition,	  and	  Culture	  Meet.	  Mahwah:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum.	  Kockelman,	  Paul.	  2005.	  “The	  Semiotic	  Stance.”	  Semiotica	  157	  (1/4):	  233–304.	  ———.	  2006.	  “Residence	  in	  the	  World:	  Affordances,	  Instruments,	  Actions,	  Roles,	  and	  Identities.”	  Semiotica	  162	  (1-­‐4):	  19–71.	  ———.	  2007.	  “Agency:	  The	  Relation	  Between	  Meaning,	  Power,	  and	  Knowledge.”	  
Current	  Anthropology	  48	  (3):	  375–401.	  Langacker,	  Ronald	  W.	  1987.	  Foundations	  of	  Cognitive	  Grammar:	  Volume	  I,	  
Theoretical	  Prerequisites.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  Levinson,	  Stephen	  C.	  1983.	  Pragmatics.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  2000.	  Presumptive	  Meanings:	  The	  Theory	  of	  Generalized	  Conversational	  
Implicature.	  Cambridge,	  MA/London:	  MIT	  Press.	  Liddell,	  Scott	  K.	  2003.	  Grammar,	  Gesture,	  and	  Meaning	  in	  American	  Sign	  
Language.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Liszkowski,	  Ulf.	  2006.	  “Infant	  Pointing	  at	  Twelve	  Months:	  Communicative	  Goals,	  Motives,	  and	  Social-­‐cognitive	  Abilities.”	  In	  Roots	  of	  Human	  Sociality:	  
Culture,	  Cognition,	  and	  Interaction,	  ed.	  N.	  J.	  Enfield	  and	  Stephen	  C.	  Levinson,	  153–178.	  London:	  Berg.	  Liszkowski,	  Ulf,	  Malinda	  Carpenter,	  A	  Henning,	  Tricia	  Striano,	  and	  Michael	  Tomasello.	  2004.	  “Twelve-­‐	  Month-­‐olds	  Point	  to	  Share	  Attention	  and	  Interest.”	  Developmental	  Science	  7	  (3):	  297–307.	  Mandel,	  Mark.	  1977.	  “Iconic	  Devices	  in	  American	  Sign	  Language.”	  In	  On	  the	  Other	  
Hand:	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  American	  Sign	  Language,	  ed.	  Lynn	  A.	  Friedman,	  57–107.	  New	  York:	  Academic	  Press.	  McNeill,	  David.	  1992.	  Hand	  and	  Mind:	  What	  Gestures	  Reveal	  About	  Thought.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  ———.	  2005.	  Gesture	  and	  Thought.	  Chicago	  and	  London:	  Chicago	  University	  Press.	  Müller,	  Cornelia.	  1998.	  “Iconicity	  and	  Gesture.”	  In	  Oralité	  Et	  Gestualité:	  
Communication	  Multimodale,	  Interaction,	  ed.	  Serge	  Santi,	  Isabelle	  Guaïtella,	  Christian	  Cavé,	  and	  Gabrielle	  Konopczynski,	  321–328.	  Paris:	  L’Harmattan.	  Okrent,	  Arika.	  2002.	  “A	  Modality-­‐free	  Notion	  of	  Gesture	  and	  How	  It	  Can	  Help	  Us	  with	  the	  Morpheme	  Vs.	  Gesture	  Question	  in	  Sign	  Language	  Linguistics	  (or	  at	  Least	  Give	  Us	  Some	  Criteria	  to	  Work	  With).”	  In	  Modality	  and	  Structure	  
in	  Signed	  and	  Spoken	  Languages,	  ed.	  Richard	  P.	  Meier,	  Kearsy	  Cormier,	  and	  David	  Quinto-­‐Pozos,	  175–198.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Özyürek,	  Asli,	  Roel	  M.	  Willems,	  Sotaro	  Kita,	  and	  Peter	  Hagoort.	  2007.	  “On-­‐line	  Integration	  of	  Semantic	  Information	  from	  Speech	  and	  Gesture:	  Insights	  from	  Event-­‐related	  Brain	  Potentials.”	  Journal	  of	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience	  19	  (4):	  605–616.	  Parmentier,	  Richard	  J.	  1994.	  Signs	  in	  Society:	  Studies	  in	  Semiotic	  Anthropology.	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis:	  Indiana	  University	  Press.	  Pawley,	  Andrew,	  and	  Frances	  Syder.	  2000.	  “The	  One	  Clause	  at	  a	  Time	  Hypothesis.”	  In	  Perspectives	  on	  Fluency,	  ed.	  Heidi	  Riggenbach,	  163–191.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press.	  Peirce,	  Charles	  S.	  1955.	  Philosophical	  Writings	  of	  Peirce.	  New	  York:	  Dover	  Publications.	  




Preissler,	  Melissa	  Allen,	  and	  Paul	  Bloom.	  2008.	  “Two-­‐year-­‐olds	  Use	  Artist	  Intention	  to	  Understand	  Drawings.”	  Cognition	  106:	  512–518.	  Richert,	  Rebekah	  A.,	  and	  Angeline	  S.	  Lillard.	  2002.	  “Children’s	  Understanding	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  Prerequisites	  of	  Drawing	  and	  Pretending.”	  Developmental	  
Psychology	  38	  (6):	  1004–1015.	  Ruiter,	  Jan	  Peter	  De,	  Stephane	  Rossignol,	  Louis	  Vuurpijl,	  Douglas	  W.	  Cunningham,	  and	  Willem	  J.	  M.	  Levelt.	  2003.	  “SLOT:	  a	  Research	  Platform	  for	  Investigating	  Multimodal	  Communication.”	  Behavior	  Research	  Methods,	  
Instruments,	  and	  Computers	  35	  (3):	  408–419.	  Sacks,	  Harvey.	  1992.	  Lectures	  on	  Conversation.	  London:	  Blackwell.	  Sacks,	  Harvey,	  Emanuel	  A.	  Schegloff,	  and	  Gail	  Jefferson.	  1974.	  “A	  Simplest	  Systematics	  for	  the	  Organization	  of	  Turn-­‐taking	  for	  Conversation.”	  
Language	  50	  (4):	  696–735.	  Saussure,	  Ferdinand	  de.	  1959.	  Course	  in	  General	  Linguistics.	  New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill.	  Schegloff,	  Emanuel	  A.	  1968.	  “Sequencing	  in	  Conversational	  Openings.”	  American	  
Anthropologist	  70	  (6):	  1075–1095.	  ———.	  2007.	  Sequence	  Organization	  in	  Interaction:	  a	  Primer	  in	  Conversation	  
Analysis,	  Volume	  1.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Schutz,	  Alfred.	  1970.	  On	  Phenomenology	  and	  Social	  Relations.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Searle,	  John	  R.	  1969.	  Speech	  Acts:	  An	  Essay	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Language.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Silverstein,	  Michael.	  1976.	  “Shifters,	  Linguistic	  Categories,	  and	  Cultural	  Description.”	  In	  Meaning	  in	  Anthropology,	  ed.	  K.	  Basso	  and	  H.	  Selby,	  11–55.	  Albuquerque:	  University	  of	  New	  Mexico	  Press.	  Sperber,	  Dan,	  and	  Dierdre	  Wilson.	  1995.	  Relevance:	  Communication	  and	  
Cognition	  (2nd	  Edition).	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  Streeck,	  Jürgen.	  2009.	  Gesturecraft:	  The	  Manu-­‐facture	  of	  Meaning.	  Amsterdam:	  Benjamins.	  	  Talmy,	  Leonard.	  2006.	  “The	  Representation	  of	  Spatial	  Structure	  in	  Spoken	  and	  Signed	  Language.”	  In	  Space	  in	  Languages:	  Linguistic	  Systems	  and	  Cognitive	  
Categories,	  ed.	  Maya	  Hickmann	  and	  Robert	  Stéphane,	  207–238.	  Amsterdam:	  Benjamins.	  Tomasello,	  Michael.	  2006.	  “Why	  Don’t	  Apes	  Point?”	  In	  Roots	  of	  Human	  Sociality:	  
Culture,	  Cognition,	  and	  Interaction,	  ed.	  N.	  J.	  Enfield	  and	  Stephen	  C.	  Levinson,	  506–524.	  London:	  Berg.	  Tomasello,	  Michael,	  Malinda	  Carpenter,	  Josep	  Call,	  Tanya	  Behne,	  and	  Henrike	  Moll.	  2005.	  “Understanding	  and	  Sharing	  Intentions:	  The	  Origins	  of	  Cultural	  Cognition.”	  Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences	  28	  (5):	  664–670.	  Wierzbicka,	  Anna.	  1985.	  Lexicography	  and	  Conceptual	  Analysis.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  Karoma.	  ———.	  1996.	  Semantics:	  Primes	  and	  Universals.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Wilkins,	  David	  P.	  2006.	  “Review	  of	  Adam	  Kendon	  (2004).	  Gesture:	  Visible	  Action	  as	  Utterance”	  6	  (1):	  119–144.







FIGURE	  1.1	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.1.	  Man	  (left	  of	  image)	  speaking	  of	  preferred	  angle	  of	  a	  drainage	  pipe	  under	  construction:	  ‘Make	  it	  steep	  like	  this.’	  	  	  	  
	   	  








Figure	  1.2.	  Man	  describing	  the	  sòòn5,	  a	  traditional	  Lao	  fish	  trap:	  ‘As	  for	  the	  
sòòn5,	  they	  make	  it	  fluted	  at	  the	  mouth.’	  	  	   	  






















· semiotic function: indexical (in that the directional orientation of the gesture is determined by the 
conceived location of a referent), and symbolic (in that the form of pointing can be locally 
conventionalized); the hands are used to bring the referent and the attention of the addressee 
together;  
- in concrete deixis, the referent is a physical entity in the speech situation, while in abstract 
deixis the referent is a reference-assigned chunk of space with stable coordinates  
- in pointing, the attention of the addressee is directed to the referent by some vector-projecting 
articulator (such as the index finger or gaze). 
- in placing, the referent is positioned for the attention of the addressee 
(Nb.: Gaze plays an important role in deictic gestures; it projects its own attention-directing 
vector which may (a) reinforce a deictic hand gesture by providing a second vector oriented 
towards the same referent, and (b) assist in the management of attention-direction during 
production of other gestures.) 
Interacting: 
· semiotic function: iconic (in that the hands imitate an action) and indexical (in that the shape of the 
hands is not the shape of the referent, but is determined by the shape of the referent); the hands are 
meant to look as if they were interacting with the referent; 
- in mimetic enactment, the hands are moving as if they are doing something to or with the 
referent 
- in holding, the hands are shaped to look as if they are holding the referent 
Modeling:  
· semiotic function: iconic; the hands are meant to look as if they are the referent 
- in analogic enactment, the hand’s movement imitates the movement of the referent 
- in static modeling, the hand’s shape imitates the shape of the referent 
Tracing:  
· semiotic function: iconic (in that the gesture imitates drawing) and indexical (in that only part of 
the referent is depicted, but the whole is referred to); the hands (more specifically, the fingers) are 
meant to look as if they were tracing the shape of some salient feature of the referent, such as its 
outline.  
 
 	   	  Figure	  1.4.	  Sketch	  of	  some	  semiotic	  devices	  used	  in	  illustrative	  co-­‐speech	  gestures	  (cf.	  Mandel	  1977,	  Kendon	  1988,	  Müller	  1998).	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